THE 'SCIENCE' OF PRE-CRIME

THE SECRET 'RADICALISATION' STUDY UNDERPINNING PREVENT
The 'science' of pre-crime

The 'science' of pre-crime
The secret ‘radicalisation’ study underpinning PREVENT

CAGE is an independent advocacy organisation working to empower communities impacted by the War on Terror policies worldwide. The organisation highlights and campaigns against such policies in hope to achieve a world free from oppression and injustice.

© Copyright 2016 CAGE Advocacy UK Ltd. All rights reserved.

Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Copies may not be duplicated for commercial purposes.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:
We would like to thank all of the reviewers who contributed their time to scrutinise this work in close detail. Their comments helped to improve our argument and content, and in light of our calls for transparency, it is important to recognise their contribution.

AUTHOR:
Asim Qureshi:
Asim is CAGE’s Research Director, graduated in Law (LLB Hons) and LLM, specialising in Human Rights and Islamic Law. He is the Director of Catalyst Worldwide Consulting, and since 2004 has specialised in investigations into the impact of counter-terrorism practices worldwide. In 2009, his book, Rules of the Game: Detention, Deportation, Disappearance, was published by Hurst, Columbia University Press and later by Oxford University Press. In 2010, he began advising the legal teams involved in defending terrorism trials in the US and at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
CONTENTS

1. ABSTRACT
2. REVIEWERS
3. FOREWORD
   - Professor Arun Kundnani
   - Professor David Miller
   - Dr Leda Blackwood
   - Professor Adam Gearey
4. INTRODUCTION
   - Key areas of concern
   - Methodology
5. THE GOVERNMENT RADICALISATION MODEL
   - Government’s position: vulnerability to ‘radicalisation’
   - ERG22+ authors
THE ‘EVIDENCE’ BASE AND METHODOLOGY

- Data and ‘evidence’ base
- The ‘omission’ of political grievance as a factor
- Reliability and validity
- The ERG22+ as a public relations exercise

ERG22+ IN THE ‘PRE-CRIMINAL’ SPACE

- The application of the ERG22+ to the wider population
- Can the ERG22+ predict future violence?

THE ERG22+ STANDARD OF ‘PEER REVIEW’

- Face and content validity

THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF ‘RADICALISATION’ THEORY

CONCLUSION

RECOMMENDATIONS
ABSTRACT

KEY POINTS

• The ‘study’ behind ‘radicalisation’ has been classified.
• The evidence is unproven and has not been thoroughly tested.
• It was intended only for professionals but has been implemented beyond its original remit.

In July 2015, the UK government introduced a statutory duty on all public sector workers to spot the signs of ‘radicalisation’ in order to stop their charges being ‘drawn into terrorism’. The government uses a system of 22 factors that has been developed to train these public sector employees in spotting signs of vulnerability.

This CAGE report, details for the first time how the government produced these factors in secret, and subsequently relied on an evidence base that was not only unproven, but extended far beyond its original remit. Key among our findings, is the admission by those who wrote the study, that they did not factor political grievance into the modelling, a fact they say was, “perhaps an omission”. Further, the government’s study states that only trained professionals should be using these factors, and yet they have been rolled out nationally under a statutory duty imposed under the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 – ultimately being used in what they term the pre-crime space.
In the spirit of interdisciplinary concern over the findings and conclusions in this report, the following academics all reviewed this report in a call for transparency and accountability:

- Professor Catarina Kinnvall • Psychology
- Dr Leda Blackwood • Psychology
- Prof David Miller • Sociology
- Prof Arun Kundnani • Media, Culture and Communication
- Prof Tariq Ramadan • Islamic Studies
- Prof Adam Gearey • Law
- Prof Laleh Khalili • Politics and International Studies
- Prof Bob Brecher • Philosophy
- Prof Vian Bakir • Political Communication
- Dr Lisa Stampnitzky • Politics
- Dr Narzanin Massoumi • Sociology
- Dr Sadia Habib • Education
- Dr Nadine El-Enany • Law
- Dr Rizwaan Sabir • Criminology
- Dr Katy Sian • Sociology
- Dr Fahid Qureshi • Criminology
- Dr Charlotte Heath-Kelly • Politics and International Studies
- Dr Tom Mills • Sociology
After scrutinising the study from which the assessment tool was derived, it becomes clear that the model is unfit for the purpose it was created, and further that the manner in which it has been applied by the government goes beyond the parameters set by the psychologists who originally developed it.
Over the last fifteen years, millions of dollars, pounds, and euros have been spent on research that tries to identify some set of radicalization factors that can predict who is going to be a terrorist. University departments, think-tanks, and national security agencies have all tried to discover a profile that can be applied to what law enforcement agencies call the “pre-criminal space” – the period before an individual begins terrorist activity. No profile that stands up to scholarly scrutiny has ever been discovered. But that has not stopped a proliferation of bogus “radicalization models” in policy-making.

How has this happened? The answer lies in the way that “knowledge” in the field of radicalization studies has been constrained and circumscribed by states. National security agencies have constituted the field, defined the object of knowledge, and set the questions to be studied. Thus, rather than ask what are the social, political, and historical causes of terrorism, radicalization studies ask what leads an individual to adopt an extremist ideology assumed (incorrectly) to be correlated with terrorism. In taking this approach, the political solutions we need are neglected and instead we get a rationale for surveillance that leads to suspicion falling upon thousands of law-abiding individuals. The “pre-criminal space” is really the “non-criminal space.”

With hundreds of thousands of public sector workers in Britain now required to absorb the government’s Extremist Risk Guidance and apply it in their work, the dangers of this research have never been greater. This report’s cataloguing of the intellectual flaws and damaging implications of the official radicalization model is therefore of crucial importance.

Department of Media, Culture and Communication
New York University
PROFESSOR DAVID MILLER

This report raises far-reaching questions about evidence base and credibility of the government’s counter-terrorism strategy and specifically the idea that ‘signs’ of ‘extremism’ can be listed and categorised.

The most important question raised in this report is about the secrecy and lack of proper scrutiny of the study that posits 22 signs of vulnerability to extremism. The original study has never been published and it has - as a result – not been available for proper scrutiny by scholars and scientists. This is a fundamental violation of the principles on which any scientific endeavour rests. The full study and supporting data should now be made publically available along with information about the role of government officials in the creation, execution, writing and publication of the study.

Furthermore, it is not clear what kind of peer review was undergone by the subsequent article, based on the original study, published some five years later, in 2015. The journal in question should take steps to clarify its peer review process and whether, given the original study remains classified, peer reviewers could possibly have come to an informed judgement on the article.

The report argues that a key limitation of the study is its failure to properly examine the fact that ‘political context’ is a key factor in ‘extremism’. This seems to me to be correct – a view widely supported in the serious scientific literature. But perhaps we can go further and raise fundamental questions about the very concept of extremism and indeed ‘radicalisation’. Though they have been widely criticized in the academic literature, some scholars still defend these terms as having its uses. This defence is undermined by the fact that the concepts as used by the security and intelligence nexus has no scientific basis. It is well known, and even admitted by orthodox scholars, that the idea of radicalisation came not from academia and science but from the very security and intelligence agencies that use it so relentlessly. This report further undermines such concepts, leaving them looking increasingly threadbare.

If the UK government and the intelligence and security agencies were interested in evidence-based policy, they would take immediate steps to dismantle the legislation they have erected on the basis of research that is inadequate by virtue of being secret, of poor quality, and even, in its own terms.

Finally, I note that this report has uncovered what appear to be very worrying details about the scientific and evidential basis of counterterror policy and legislation. It comes not from academics studying these issues, nor indeed from investigative journalists. It has not been produced by any of the mainstream human rights or civil liberties organisations. It has instead been produced by a small human rights organisation called Cage. An organisation widely denounced and excoriated in the media, by the political class and even by some on the left. Its bank accounts shut down, its charitable funders threatened by the government, its spokespeople repeatedly libelled. This report is testament to the importance of organisations like Cage that investigate human rights abuses regardless of who they are committed against and, perhaps as importantly, who they are committed by.

Department of Social & Policy Sciences
University of Bath

This report raises important questions for psychologists. Most importantly, we are reminded that our psychological research can be used for purposes that it was not designed for; and that this can cause great harm.

Relationships of trust in our communities are being broken and individuals’ lives tragically affected by the misguided notion that armed with a list of factors we can predict who will embrace political violence. Just as concerning is the failure to recognize that we are creating the very experiences that lend credence to mobilizers of hate.

In a climate of fear, the psychology community must surely have a greater not a lesser responsibility to ensure that the psychological evidence-base informing government policy is fit for purpose; and that we maintain the independence and transparency of our profession. I hope that this report will spark discussion in our community about how we do just that.

The limits of the ERG research used to create state duties raises profound questions about transparency and accountability. This is particularly so in the law making process that lies behind the statutory implementation of PREVENT.

Seemingly, a line of recent case law suggests that individuals and families are being brought before secret courts on the basis of definitions derived from classified research, and thus raises immediate concerns in relation to our justice system.

It would appear somewhat paradoxical that a strategy meant to protect and uphold the rule of law and due process fails a most basic test as to its own integrity.
INTRODUCTION

On 2 July 2015, David H Hoffman presented an Independent Review Report ('the Hoffman Report') to a special committee of the American Psychological Association's Board of Directors. The report inquired, “...whether APA officials colluded with DoD, CIA, or other government officials “to support torture.”” The findings of the report ultimately proved how psychologists played a key role in developing a programme of torture that would be used to harm detainees being held in the US High Value Detainee programme.

The Hoffman report, its findings, and the collusion of psychologists presents an important backdrop to this report, not because of the content, but rather due to the way in which national security programmes have recruited psychologists to produce 'scientific' tools to help them reach their goals and objectives, all behind a wall of secrecy.

In a similar fashion, this CAGE report details how the UK government has used British psychologists to develop a 'deradicalisation' model for ‘extremist behaviour’ through a classified study at the National Offenders Management Service (NOMS) – responsible for managing the prison population of the UK. The
The secret ‘radicalisation’ study underpinning PREVENT

The scandal of the psychologists Mitchell and Jessen allegedly being involved in the CIA High Value Detainee: Rendition Detention Interrogation programme, is the most recent example of psychologists crossing the line between psychology theory and state sanctioned abuses.

2 | United States Department of Defense
3 | United States Central Intelligence Agency
5 | The scandal of the psychologists Mitchell and Jessen allegedly being involved in the CIA High Value Detainee: Rendition Detention Interrogation programme, is the most recent example of psychologists crossing the line between psychology theory and state sanctioned abuses.

In the summer of 2015, the British government made it statutory for all public sector employees to spot the signs of ‘radicalisation’ based on indicators developed by Dean and Lloyd. The training material, based on the Channel Vulnerability Assessment Framework 2012, contained 22 factors derived from a tool called the Extremist Risk Guidance 22+ (ERG22+). This tool would help public sector employees spot anybody vulnerable to the risk of ‘radicalisation’.

However, after scrutinising the study from which the assessment tool was derived, it becomes clear that the model is unfit for the purpose it was created, and further that the manner in which it has been applied by the government goes beyond the parameters set by the psychologists who originally developed it.

Placing the initial concerns with the study to one side, what is worrying is that the government placed a model on statutory footing a model that has had no external or wider peer review by the psychology community, to which the authors of the model belong. Recent history has provided many examples of how such forms of ‘science’ without any form of external scrutiny have led to abuses not only within the psychology community, but also within law and society. This report argues that such forms of unscrutinised ‘science’ lead to the justification of policies that permit and legitimise the abuse of individuals and communities. It is therefore imperative that this is documented and scrutinised.

Based on investigations conducted by CAGE, the British Psychological Society did not play a role in the formulation of the government study. Furthermore, both authors are registered as chartered psychology practitioners with the Health and Care Professionals Council; a regulating body that oversees the work of health professional and psychology practitioners. In light of their professional associations, questions continue to remain about the standards of ethical clearance for the study.
As part of CAGE’s work on PREVENT, the organisation has been highlighting both the theoretical and practical problems associated with the strategy and policy. In 2008, we began to critique the PREVENT strategy openly, explaining how it would lead to the over-reporting of suspect communities. This was followed up by seminal reports such as *Good Muslim – Bad Muslim* and *The Prevent Strategy: A Cradle to Grave Police State*, both of which highlighted how the successive governments had instituted a policy that would systematically discriminate against Muslims communities, and ultimately increase disenfranchisement.

Most significantly, CAGE helped to organise a joint letter in 2015 that over 300 academics signed, expressing concern over the way in which PREVENT limits freedoms and would have a chilling effect on free speech. In responding to the joint letter, the government mentioned 22 factors that were used in order to train frontline staff in understanding pathways of ‘radicalisation’. This admission by the government encouraged CAGE to write to both the UK Parliament Home Affairs Select Committee (HASC) and the Royal College of Psychiatry (RCP) about the ERG22+ in November 2015, seeking clarification on its ‘science’ and use. While the HASC did not respond to us in their review of the government’s ‘extremism’ strategies, the RCP in September 2016 released a position statement on counter-terrorism in the industry. For the purposes of this report, it is significant to note the RCP’s view on the ERG22+:

“Data on evaluations of Prevent, as with any initiative requiring public services to alter their practice, must be in the public domain and subjected to peer review and scientific scrutiny. Public policy cannot be based on either no evidence or a lack of transparency about evidence. The evidence underpinning the UK’s Extremism Risk Guidance 22+ (ERG22+; HM Government 2011c), and other data relating to this guidance, should be comprehensively published and readily accessible.”

With the psychiatry community calling for an open and transparent approach to the ERG22+, this CAGE report takes on increasingly significant meaning. As mentioned in the section below, there are a number of key concerns that arise from not only the ERG22+ as a structure, but also the way in which it was produced.

---

6 | Verkaik R, Government de-radicalisation plan will brand Muslims with beards as terrorists, say academics, The Independent, 10 July 2015

7 | ibid

8 | Royal College of Psychiatry, Counter-terrorism and psychiatry: Position Statement PS04/16, September 2016
KEY AREAS OF CONCERN

Highlighted within the report are a number of key areas of concern, including:

• The theory and conclusions of the ERG22+ study being unproven.

• The use of the factors from the study to introduce the concept of pre-criminalisation. This is a use that extends far beyond the original remit.

• The non-recognition of political context as being a significant factor within a multitude that result in disenfranchisement.

• No external oversight from the psychology community of the government’s ERG study raising questions of ethics. The authors of the study worked for NOMS, and two members of the advisory committee overseeing the study, were chosen as independent reviewers.

• A lack of credible peer review processes to verify the ‘science’ that was relied on to validate the assessment tool.

• A lack of replicated research supporting the findings of the NOMS study, a process that should have been a precondition to the UK government using the findings as part of its PREVENT and CHANNEL policies.

As part of our recommendations, CAGE seeks to persuade the psychology community to call for an opening of discussion and review of the ERG22+ and the way in which it has been implemented. Further, we reaffirm that the PREVENT strategy has to end, as it has failed the communities both in its theory, scientific support, and practice.
The scandal of the psychologists Mitchell and Jessen allegedly being involved in the CIA High Value Detainee: Rendition Detention Interrogation programme, is the most recent example of psychologists crossing the line between psychology theory and state sanctioned abuses.
The secret ‘radicalisation’ study underpinning PREVENT

The secret ‘radicalisation’ study underpinning PREVENT has scientific validity models, we find their claims to be wholly inadequate.

We then look at how the findings of the study produced by Lloyd and Dean have been used by the UK government within the ‘pre-criminal’ space of its PREVENT and CHANNEL programmes. With section 26(1) of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2015 placing PREVENT at a statutory level, the government’s use of the classified study takes on further significance.

In the penultimate section, we end by raising concerns about the processes of validation and review undertaken in the course of producing the study. We highlight how not only was the process of external review problematic, but also that the tools to measure validity were inappropriate, especially when the findings of the study were to be used by the government as part of a statutory programme.

Finally, we provide examples of how the courts have taken on the government’s ‘radicalisation’ model through the PREVENT and CHANNEL programmes, and even quoted the ERG22+ as being accepted ‘science’. The decisions taken in these cases are being based on a ‘science’ that has neither been confirmed nor been open to scrutiny, and thus brings the judgements into disrepute.

The above form just a few of the concerns that are outlined in this report. Some of the other concerns include the way in which not only the government, but psychologists working with the government have conducted themselves by designing poor research and using that as a basis to create legislation. Instead of taking sound scientific approaches to the production and deliverance of the study, they have chosen instead to use a wall of secrecy to push through PREVENT policies, forcing the public sector to play a role based wholly on questionable ‘science’.

METHODOLOGY

The structure of this report entails a critical assessment of the journal article written by Christopher Dean and Monica Lloyd on their production of the ERG22+ set of ‘radicalisation’ factors. CAGE was not able to access the original study, due to its classified status by the UK government. However, the journal article describing the study provides an important insight into the evidence base and methodology employed by the authors.

The CAGE report begins by providing a brief background to the UK’s PREVENT and CHANNEL policies, and the way in which they have incorporated ‘radicalisation’ factors as a key element of their programmes – to the extent of placing them on a statutory level. We further detail the profiles of Monica Lloyd and Christopher Dean. This has been done specifically to understand the expertise they brought to this crucial part of the government’s PREVENT strategy. As former employees of the National Offenders Management Service (NOMS), questions must be raised around how they were solely commissioned with such an important task.

The section entitled, The evidence base and methodology, is perhaps the most important for the purposes of this report. We examine the evidence base that is presented by the authors. While we do not have access to their datasets due to the government’s wall of secrecy, we do have the ability to assess their approach to the data, and in particular the quality of that data. This section looks at the factors they have developed, and the extent to which political grievance as a major factor was ultimately ignored within the study.

The analysis of the journal article produced by Lloyd and Dean begins by assessing the validity of the research models that have been deployed, in particular focusing on their own claims of validity. When assessing the processes in terms of adequate peer review and recognised scientific validity models, we find their claims to be wholly inadequate.
On 23 October 2012, the UK government published the CHANNEL Vulnerability Assessment (CVA) Framework and soon after, its guide for partners.

In the publication, the government stated that:

“This framework is based on the evidence base of National Offender Management Service’s ERG22+ framework”

The NOMS ERG22+ framework is the only study that established the government’s guidance on ‘radicalisation’, which was then used to support a model for ‘deradicalisation’. The study carries the following citation, but cannot be found or obtained after it was withheld from public scrutiny by the government:


Over the years, the government has officially alluded to this study in statements to the press, recognising that there is indeed a system
of factors that they believe determines how individuals become ‘radicalised’. In one example, a Home Office spokesman stated:

“The CHANNEL programme, a part of PREVENT, assesses the vulnerability of those referred to it using a comprehensive system of 22 different factors...”

What is missing and what should have been made accessible to academics and psychology professionals was the actual science behind the study that the government produced in order to prove that the 22 factors were empirically robust. However, as we have mentioned earlier, the ‘science’ is not accessible and we believe it was hidden on purpose due to the nature of the study. Even most recently, the academic page of Monica Lloyd, one of the two authors of the government study, at Birmingham University, mentions the study with the crucial inclusion of the word, “classified”, at the end of the citation, once again reaffirming that the study is being withheld on the basis of national security.

Moreover, as shall be discussed later in the report, the ERG22+ is being used by the government in a capacity beyond its original intention or ‘science’, particularly in relation to the CHANNEL programme. It is important to note, that CHANNEL is a sub-set of PREVENT, and thus the factors are also applied in the circumstance of monitoring individuals and communities in the ‘pre-criminal’ space, as well as part of the government’s deradicalisation programme. This has led to a total occupation of the government’s ‘radicalisation’ modelling by the ERG22+, and thus must be opened up to further scrutiny.
GOVERNMENT’S POSITION: VULNERABILITY TO RADICALISATION

On the Home Office website, the CHANNEL vulnerability assessment page describes the use of the framework:

“Local partnerships that deliver CHANNEL use a vulnerability assessment framework to assess whether individuals need support to safeguard them from the risk of being targeted by terrorists and radicalisers. The framework covers 22 factors that may cause someone to:

- Engage with a terrorist group, cause or ideology
- Develop the intent to cause harm
- Develop the capability to cause harm

The characteristics covered by the vulnerability assessment framework do not necessarily indicate that a person needs CHANNEL support or will become a terrorist. Local practitioners use the framework to complement their professional judgement when making decisions.”

The government has therefore provided a framework for public sectors workers, under Section 26(1) of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, to spot the signs of radicalisation, as these employees are under a statutory duty to do so. Failure to comply may result in the public sector worker being taken to court and potentially punished for non-compliance.

The framework explains that it is based around three dimensions of radicalisation:
The CHANNEL Vulnerability Assessment framework further divides these areas up with more specific examples of factors.

**ENGAGEMENT**

1. Grievance/injustice
2. Threat
3. Identity, meaning and belonging
4. Status
5. Excitement, comradeship or adventure
6. Dominance and control
7. Susceptibility to indoctrination
8. Political/moral motivation
9. Opportunistic involvement
10. Family and/or friends support extremist offending
11. Transitional periods
12. Group influence and control
13. Mental health

(Some other factors are also suggested, but not expanded on within the CVA framework.)

**CAPABILITY FACTORS**

20. Individual knowledge, skills and competencies
21. Access to networks, funding or equipment for terrorism
22. Criminal capability

Those tasked with using these factors in order to engage with communities are largely public sector workers, who have a statutory duty to use this guidance in order to report on individuals under their charge.

**INTENT FACTORS**

14. Over-identification with a group, cause or ideology
15. Them and Us thinking
16. Dehumanisation of the enemy
17. Attitudes that justify offending
18. Harmful means to an end
19. Harmful objectives
The science of pre-crime

In 2010, the government completed its study into radicalisation processes which culminated in the Extremism Risk Guidelines: ERG 22+ Structured Professional guidelines for Assessing Risk of Extremist Offending. This study was used in order to set out the 22 factors of radicalisation mentioned above in the CHANNEL Vulnerability Assessment (CVA) Framework.

The chief authors of the study were Monica Lloyd and Christopher Dean, at the time forensic psychologists at the National Offender Management Service (NOMS). Dean later went on to become the Director of Identify Psychological Services Ltd (seemingly a private consultancy), which Monica Lloyd later joined as an associate. Their profiles highlight the degree to which they have been involved in the development of the UK government’s PREVENT and CHANNEL strategies.

CHRISTOPHER DEAN (BSC, MSC, C.PSYCHOL, AFBPS, C.SCI)

"Chris is a Registered Forensic and Practitioner Psychologist with the Health and Care Professions Council, a Chartered Psychologist and Associate Fellow of the British Psychological Society. Chris has worked as a forensic psychologist for over 15 years in prisons, high secure hospitals and in National Offender Management Services (NOMS) headquarters.

From 2008 - 2015 he was a member and then head of, a specialist team in NOMS who have pioneered the development of innovative, psychologically-informed assessments and interventions to prevent extremism, terrorism and group-based violence. These include the Extremism Risk Guidelines (ERG 22+), Extremism Risk Screen (ERS), Healthy Identity Intervention (HII), Developing Dialogues (DD) and Identity Matters (IM). The Extremism Risk Guidelines and Developing Dialogues have also been adapted to assess and intervene with individuals in the community (through the CHANNEL process) identified as having an interest in extremist ideas, groups or causes."

Dean has further played roles with the UK government and international bodies on the agenda of ‘extremism’ and interventions.
The secret ‘radicalisation’ study underpinning PREVENT

Monica is a Registered Forensic and Practitioner Psychologist with the Health and Care Professions Council, a Chartered Psychologist and Associate Fellow of the British Psychological Society. Monica has worked as a forensic psychologist for over 25 years in prisons, for HM Inspectorate of Prisons and in the headquarters of the National Offender Management Services (NOMS). Before leaving she worked in a specialist team in NOMS to develop psychologically-informed assessments for those convicted of terrorist offences or about whom there were extremism concerns. These included the Extremism Risk Guidelines (ERG 22+) and Extremism Risk Screen (ERS).

Since leaving NOMS Monica has adapted these products for the Home Office CHANNEL programme and for local projects working to counter extremism in the community.

Monica is now a Senior Lecturer at the Centre for Forensic and Criminological Psychology at the University of Birmingham and Co-Investigator for the ESRC funded Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST) project ‘Actors and Narratives’ strand.

Both authors of the report continue to have significant roles in relation to counter-terrorism and extremism work. What is important, however, is to assess their work in 2010 while they were employees of the National Offenders Management Service, and evaluate how their contributions were used by the government at a national level.
The CHANNEL programme, a part of PREVENT, assesses the vulnerability of those referred to it using a comprehensive system of 22 different factors...

Home Office Spokesman
The current lack of demonstrated reliability and validity remains the main limitation of the ERG at this time.

ERG 22+ Report Authors
The journal article written by Lloyd and Dean, entitled, *The Development of Structured Guidelines for Assessing Risk in Extremist Offenders*, does not provide a complete picture of the original study and the datasets, but does give a picture of the methodology that was employed by the authors. Within the methodology, they not only describe what their datasets were largely comprised of, but also the way in which they understood that data.

### KEY POINTS

- The ERG22+ ‘study’ is based on a very limited number of terrorism related offenders.
- The findings have been implemented across wider society without scrutiny.
- The authors are uncertain about the ‘reliability and validity’ of their findings.

### DATA AND ‘EVIDENCE’ BASE

As discussed in the article by Lloyd and Dean, the precursor to the ERG22+ was the Structured Risk Guidance (SRG). The methodology described by the authors explains how the initial intention was to have a structured approach to collecting data in order to be able to assess the way in which ‘radicalisation’ processes are produced and thus to be able to create assessment factors. The authors acknowledge that a great problem with this approach was their inability to access offenders to take part in the study.
“Negotiating the cooperation of the offenders themselves to engage in conversations was a challenging task; tape recording and transcribing interviews was not acceptable to prison officials or offenders or their lawyers, therefore the methodology could not be developed through a conventional academic approach. Some offenders refused to speak to us, some insisted that our interview notes were shared with them and signed by them as a true record, and some agreed to speak but changed their mind at the last minute.

Despite these challenges, casework contact gradually grew, providing the opportunity to learn about pathway influences and susceptibilities. This paper describes how the methodology was developed to be clinically sensitive, empirically grounded, and ethically defensible.”

The information provided by Lloyd and Dean is a little unclear, as they do not clarify the figures of those involved in their study, as well as what they were convicted of. In the UK, there are over 85,000 inmates, with those convicted of terrorism-related offences forming 183 out of that group in 2016. From the 183, two-thirds relate to Muslim related terrorism in some way, while the other third is formed from far-right groups. Providing they were able to access all of the ‘al-Qaeda inspired extremist offenders’, that would still leave a sample of less than 120 at the very most, considering there would have been a number of convictions between 2010 to 2016.

16 | Ibid, p.41
17 | Silke A, How can Anjem Choudary be stopped from radicalising other prisoners?, The Conversation, 19 August 2016
SAMPLE GROUP FOR THE STUDY

According to the authors, the SRG was formulated through the collection of data over time through casework notes, rather than direct structured interviews, a problem that they acknowledge they had to contend with. The original data set was based on the case observations from 20 convicted offenders where there was some affiliation to Islam. What we do not know about this group, is what they were convicted of exactly:

“The ERG had to accommodate those convicted of extremist offenses that fell short of extremist violence, in line with U.K. legislation that set the bar lower than other jurisdictions.”  

They add, “some had a clear intent to offend that can be deduced from their actions; others are clearly engaged with a group, cause or ideology but do not intend to contribute to or perform an act of terrorism.” The purpose of the ERG is to stop people from being drawn into violent extremism by predicting behaviour, yet the authors of the study admit that the sample of individuals from which the ERG was derived had little to no intention of performing a terrorist attack.

More recently, according to Andrew Silke, out of the 183 prisoners that are deemed to be ’extremists’ about a third had refused to take part in the ERG process for deradicalisation purposes. Writing on the case of Anjem Choudary, the former head of the proscribed group al-Muhajiroun, he stated:

“Choudary will certainly be assessed using the ERG framework and in time he will also be given the chance to take part in the HII programme. Whether he accepts that opportunity or not is another matter. A third of extremist prisoners have refused to take part and among the recalcitrants are many senior figures. I suspect that Choudary will follow their example and turn down involvement in HII or similar programmes.”

In terms of the actual cases used, questions must be asked regarding to what extent the case notes/interviews were based on offences where there was no violence involved at all or no intention of doing so. The strict liability offences introduced under terrorism legislation present a wide range of offences where there is no suggestion that violent conduct was ever envisaged. Further, the study does not comment on the cases of far-right individuals convicted under the Fire and Explosives Act, rather than terrorism legislation.

It could be claimed that due to the case notes approach that was taken, it may have been prudent on the part of the authors to withhold the data from being publicly available due to details related to prisoner information and confidentiality agreements. However, there are still a number of factors that could and should have been released publicly.

---

19 | Ibid, p.42
20 | Silke A, How can Anjem Choudary be stopped from radicalising other prisoners?, The Conversation, 19 August 2016
21 | Interview with Umm Ahmed, CAGE, 4 May 2004 No.1, p.44
The findings of the study used offenders as the sample base, which is problematic as the findings were extrapolated to the real world and to other populations. At the very least, the findings, which are based on a small-scale, qualitative study, should have been scrutinised for their wider applicability, as well as the need for them to be replicated. It is unclear, but there is no evidence in the public domain that the replication was either done, or that it was possible to do.

Crucially, the authors do not acknowledge within their paper the risk that is posed by response bias. In other words, the extent to which prisoners provided answers that they felt the authorities wanted to hear. Lloyd and Dean acknowledge that their study was not carried out externally to the casework of the prisoners or with any degree of trust. The ERG was used to determine whether or not, and under what conditions, a prisoner should be released back into the general public. The reality of the ERG in operation in a prison environment appears to be somewhat different according to the case of Umm Ahmed who provided testimony to CAGE of her own experience:

“Going back to the ERG, it is relatively dangerous in fact, as it is based on your involvement, but it is designed to look into every aspect of your life and belief. I remember when they conducted my assessment, they explicitly stated that they did not consider me any kind of threat, or that I saw the UK public as a target or enemy, but during the ERG they were keen to know about my feelings on proscription of organisations. This was at the time of a post-Woolwich environment where those associated with the EDL were going around hurting Muslims. They asked about al-Muhajiroon, and I explained that under their categorisation, then yes they could potentially be proscribed, but then I said that the same standard should be applied to the EDL. The woman conducting the interview said she agreed with my viewpoint and that the EDL was a dangerous organisation – however – she still wrote into my record that I displayed having an “us v them” mentality.”

Due to the desire for freedom, former prisoners who went through the system, suggested to CAGE that they provided answers to questions they knew the trained ERG staff wanted to hear. They felt that the whole exercise was for the government to tick boxes. In this lies one of the greatest dangers of the evidence base for the ERG, that due to the casework approach and the lack of trust in direct interviews, there was no way to validate the authenticity of the opinions that were being expressed. The findings of the research, in other words, are highly questionable and contestable. Furthermore, a response bias can have a large impact on the validity of the findings and thus bring any findings derived from such data into disrepute. Without any replicable study being conducted to validate their work, it is difficult to measure the authenticity of their findings.
The ‘omission’ of political grievance as a factor

Lloyd and Dean claim that their casework findings were corroborated for the SRG by a study produced by Alyas Karmani, a community psychologist who produced a report for London Probation:

“In time, our findings were cross-referenced against those from an independent researcher and youth leader commissioned by London Probation to identify influences in the backgrounds of another 12 offenders convicted under the Terrorist Act and on license in the community.”

Karmani claimed to CAGE that neither author ever spoke to him of his findings, and that his study cannot be restricted to the 21 factors that the authors suggest made up the SRG. He rather opted for 66 factors, many of which went beyond the scope of the ERG in terms of context and environmental factors.

Between 2009 to 2011, the SRG was reconstituted into the ERG. Again, the authors provide little to no information about the data they were handling, and in particular its distribution. We know that much of their work was focused on Muslims in the UK, and in particular those Muslims who were in prison:

“Another possible limitation is that it was constructed to primarily capture the particular pathway influences and objectives of British AQ-influenced extremist offenders during the period of the Afghan and Iraqi wars.”

Strikingly, in the development of the ERG methodology, while Lloyd and Dean did factor in environmental factors that may contribute to ‘extremist’ thinking, they formally acknowledge that it was an omission to exclude political context specifically as a factor. In light of their work being carried out, “during the period of the Afghan and Iraqi wars,” this omission seems bizarre to the point of being disingenuous:

“The ERG necessarily focuses on the individual, but it also identifies the role of families and friends in providing support for offending, of groups in exerting influence or control over the individual, of transitional periods that provide a cognitive opening for potential engagement, and of access to networks that can provide the training and funding to realize a terrorist offense. In addition, political context provides the vehicle and the opportunity for the offender (Hoffman, 2006). In line with the thinking behind the Multilevel Guidelines (MLG), Professor Stephen Hart specifically advised that we should include this because it was a unique feature of extremist offending. This advice was built into the practice guidance as a contextual influence to be referenced in the assessment report, but it was not included as a factor in its own right, which was perhaps an omission.”

It is difficult to understand the omission of the authors, particularly when they further recognise:

---

23 | The Diversity Project Ltd, Reducing Influences that Radicalise Prisoners, National Probation Service, London, February 2009
25 | Ibid, p.44
“The implication is that there may be more than a single linear pathway into extremism: one that is essentially political that progresses through engagement to intent...” (our emphasis).25

The exclusion of political factors as being a relevant significant factor in its own right is important, as it not only goes against the trend of a great many studies on political violence and terrorism26, but moreover goes specifically against the findings in Alyas Karmani’s work, the same work they attribute as helping to support their own research. Karmani presents five main factors, within which two of his major themes include: perceived injustice and grievance, as well as foreign policy27. Both of these major factors are largely excluded in understanding the worldview of many young people.

With the final release of the Chilcot report into the Iraq war, it is important to acknowledge the view of the security agencies in relation to processes of ‘radicalisation’ or rather, as we prefer to call it, ‘politicisation’. Key to the evidence received by Sir John Chilcot, were the views expressed by Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller, the former head of MI5 who served between 2002–2007:

“By 2003/4 we were receiving an increasing number of leads to terrorist activity from within the UK ... our involvement in Iraq radicalised, for want of a better word ... a few among a generation ... [who] saw our involvement in Iraq, on top of our involvement in Afghanistan, as being an attack on Islam.”

When asked at the Chilcot Inquiry whether the Iraq War increased the threat of terrorism to the UK, she replied:

“I think we can produce evidence because of the numerical evidence of the number of plots, the number of leads, the number of people identified, and the correlation of that to Iraq and statements of people as to why they were involved ... So I think the answer to your ... question: yes.”28

The authors Lloyd and Dean come from a forensic perspective that leads them to pathologise and look for explanations at the individual level. For this reason they bring a very static and de-contextualised understanding as to why individuals become involved in political violence. Although the authors acknowledge the need to consider the role of environment29, they largely limit this to the role of families and friends, and access to networks. Thus, there is no recognition of a vast literature on various aspects of context including the role of authorities in confirming or disconfirming a narrative of societal prejudice towards Muslims and state illegitimacy. This is despite the authors having identified the single most important factor that is shared across their cases as injustice and political grievance. While the authors explicitly state they are not interested in the processes leading to violent ‘extremism’, this should not absolve them from responsibility to consider how the use of their research might inadvertently contribute to these processes.

28 | Wintour P, Intelligence files support claims Iraq invasion helped spawn Isis, The Guardian, 6 July 2016
RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY

Lloyd and Dean spend some time presenting their view on the validity and reliability of their findings. This becomes even more critical when the authors admit to their own failings in the research:

“The ERG is not as yet informed by an equivalent evidence base, primarily because of the paucity of equivalent research into factors underlying extremist offending.”

In their concluding remarks, they reassert this weakness in their research:

“The current lack of demonstrated reliability and validity remains the main limitation of the ERG at this time. It remains essentially a qualitative tool that requires a level of professional judgment and experience to be effectively used.”

“The ERG is work in progress... However, the circumstances of its development may have detracted from its academic credentials in that it was not based on recorded and transcribed interviews or systematically analyzed, and a transparent and replicable literature review was not conducted specifically for this purpose. We came to this work as practitioners with a strong imperative to develop products for correctional and managerial purposes. Now that the ERG dimensional model has become embedded in NOMS and a significant number of assessments have been completed, efforts are being made to further analyze its performance and to validate it more systematically.

There remain important questions to be explored, most notably around reliability and validity, but in the meantime the ERG provides a systematic, transparent, and accessible framework for engaging, assessing, and managing extremist offenders and those vulnerable to engagement in prison and the community. Such an approach is crucial in this field where public protection is a primary consideration and decision-making needs to be transparent and defensible.”

One of the member of the advisory committee for the study by Lloyd and Dean, Andrew Silke, writes of the programme and the way in which it is currently implemented:

“Launched in 2011, ERG22+ assesses offenders on 22 factors which are theoretically related to extremist offending. Staff use the model to assess an individual’s mindset and capability for terrorism. They will try to interview the prisoner as part of this assessment, and for example, an individual’s progress on the HII can feed into it.”

In consideration of the statutory requirement for all public sector workers to use the factors developed by the ERG22+ when making assessments of those under their care, these admissions by Lloyd and Dean seem to be particularly stark. How can the government implement their findings in 2011, when in 2015 the original authors remain unsure as to the “reliability and validity” of their findings? It is this question that is central to the ERG22+ and its implementation, as is the question as to why until this day, the model has not been subjected to any transparent or rigorous peer review process.

Their claim that the, “ERG is a work in progress,” carries with it a great deal of consternation, especially when these factors are applied in the real world by public sector workers who have had little or no training, and further have not been given a chance to verify the science behind these statutory obligations. What has resulted is an environment of over-reporting of individuals to the authorities due to structural coercion.

This is pertinent in light of findings that only
7% of all referrals made in 2015 to CHANNEL based on the ERG22+ factors required ‘supportive interventions’, which means 93% of all individuals were referred to CHANNEL for the wrong reasons.\textsuperscript{33} Furthermore, there is a sense, that Lloyd and Dean’s somewhat casual reference to this being a work in progress gives the impression that communities in the UK are being treated as ‘laboratory rats’ in an attempt to find a scientific justification for their theories – by all ethical standards, it is an unsound process.

Rose was presented with the view by NOMS that, in 2012, there was a rigorous scientific process undertaken in interviewing the prison population, with claims that by 2013, all 110 terrorism offenders would be interviewed as part of the process. Incongruent with the picture presented by the authors of the ERG, Natasha Sargeant who piloted the ERG at Whitemoor Prison, explained to Rose:

“The biggest surprise has been how much they wanted to talk,’ she says. ‘In some cases, there’s been this huge sense of relief at having an opportunity to explain and understand how they got involved, and then to do something about it.’\textsuperscript{38}

However, what has come to light is that Sargeant’s view is not supported by Lloyd and Dean. Their methodology highlights how they found it difficult to secure trust with the offenders they were seeking to interview – precisely why they were forced on many occasions to rely on case notes. There is a sense that the lack of external access and review of the ERG22+ data, has led to an environment where it is often cited by others with the assumption of its validity, but never genuinely scrutinised.

\textbf{THE ERG22+ AS A PUBLIC RELATIONS EXERCISE}

In 2012, the National Offenders Management Service (NOMS), undertook a public relations exercise by providing access to Belmarsh High Security prison to the journalist David Rose and the Mail on Sunday.\textsuperscript{31} In an in-depth piece written by Rose, he describes his interviews with al-Qaeda inspired terrorism convicts, and also his discussions with the prison authorities and NOMS. Rose was presented with the ERG22+ as being a model for assessing risk, but was presented with a very different picture than the one written about by Lloyd and Dean in 2015:

“Built up through months of interviews with inmates, ERG requires the psychologist to dig deep into an offender’s life story, allowing an assessment of his past and current risk...”\textsuperscript{37}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{30} Ibid, pp.47-48
\item \textsuperscript{31} Ibid, p.50
\item \textsuperscript{32} Ibid, p.51
\item \textsuperscript{33} Silke A, How can Anjem Choudary be stopped from radicalising other prisoners?, The Conversation, 19 August 2016
\item \textsuperscript{34} Lloyd M and Dean C, The Development of Structured Guidelines for Assessing Risk in Extremist Offenders, Journal of Threat Assessment and Management, 2015, p.51
\item \textsuperscript{35} Ratcliffe R, Teachers made one-third of referrals to PREVENT strategy in 2015, The Guardian, 12 July 2016
\item \textsuperscript{36} Rose D, Inside Britain’s terror cells: A chilling insight into how gangs of convicted terrorists recruit prisoners for Al Qaeda - and the courageous men and women sent in to ‘turn’ them, Mail on Sunday, 29 September 2012
\item \textsuperscript{37} Ibid
\item \textsuperscript{38} Ibid
\end{itemize}
ERG22+ IN THE ‘PRE-CRIMINAL’ SPACE

SUMMARY

• Authors acknowledge that ERG is used in the ‘pre-criminal’ space despite it being developed in the context of ‘extremists offending in prison’.
• There is no explanation as to how the government has replicated the results to fit the rest of society.
• The framework is based on problematic generalisations.

The ERG22+ was developed by Lloyd and Dean, largely in the context of what they perceived as ‘extremist’ offending in prison. Due to the lack of transparency on their data, it is difficult to say to what extent these case studies in themselves provide an adequate or representative picture. There are questions to be asked of the methodology and the conclusions that they have therefore reached.

It is, however, understandable why such factors might be needed in a prison environment. In the case of violent offenders, the prison services would need to ascertain the likelihood of an individual reoffending in some way, and thus potentially posing a risk to themselves and/or others. But the study’s credibility comes under question due to the lack of adequate empiricism, leaving even the prison aspect open to review.

Even less clear, is why in 2015, Lloyd and Dean are presenting their concerns about their study’s lack of rigour in the context of the prison environment for which the ERG22+ is applicable, yet their findings have still been implemented across the Prevent and Channel programmes nationally and extended into civil society through the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015. The authors acknowledge from the beginning of the article that the ERG22+ has:

“…also informed approaches in the community with those in the "precriminal space" within the U.K. government’s PREVENT agenda (HM Government, 2007, 2011).”

They later again in their article acknowledge the utility of the ERG22+ outside of the prison environment as it has been adopted wholesale by the government:

“The Home Office CHANNEL project that operates in the community to support and intervene with those vulnerable to extremism uses the Vulnerability Assessment Framework (HM Government, 2012) derived from the ERG to assess vulnerability and monitor the impact of interventions. Confidence in its use is associated
with the fact that it is derived from the actual pathway experiences of the “true positives” or those who have been convicted of terrorist offenses.”

Here we return to the question of the datasets that were employed in order to determine the ‘science’ of the ERG22+ and its application in both PREVENT and CHANNEL environments beyond the prison system for which it was created. There may well be a case to acknowledge the need for a system of assessment to be instituted for those who have been involved in violence, in order to understand whether or not they present a risk.

THE APPLICATION OF THE ERG22+ TO THE WIDER POPULATION

How does this apply in a wider context? Lloyd and Dean’s assumptions are based on those convicted of terrorism offences in relation to al-Qaeda, but that tells us very little about how the government was able to replicate the results and findings to wider society. Among the assumptions they make are:

1. All forms of ‘extremism’ are the same.
2. All of those who have been convicted of terrorism offences are violent terrorists, even though some laws allow individuals to be prosecuted, for example, for possessing information or indirectly encouraging terrorism. In other words, they provide no clarity as to the nature of the offences and the extent to which there was any potential for violence involved.

3. That the limited sample of terrorism offenders they spoke to who had been convicted, would replicate wider society. No evidence was provided that the ‘evidence’ gathered from offenders, could be used to understand the factors in relation to the general public.

The method that has been adopted by Lloyd and Dean to construct a framework that can be applied to entire counter-terrorism operations and ‘de-radicalisation’ more broadly, is based on highly problematic generalisations. If this framework sought to simply gain a better understanding of how offenders make sense of their paths to political violence then it may have been adequate, although that would still depend on them publishing their full data. But the method is wholly inadequate where the purpose is to assess potential to reoffend and even less so, to identify members of the general population who might offend in the future.

This would require longitudinal research designs and research with the general population. Even then, the notion that assessors would be able to predict behaviour is difficult to make, as human beings are far too complex to be reduced to factors that might predict future criminality, which is something the authors of the paper admit themselves about the ERG22+.

---

40 | Ibid, pp.49-50
41 | Martin T, Governing an unknowable future – the politics of Britain’s Prevent policy, Critical Studies on Terrorism, 2014, 7(1), pp.62-78; see also: Pantucci R, A contest to democracy? How the UK has responded to the current terrorist threat, Democratization, 2010, 17(2), pp.251-271
There is a sense, that Lloyd and Dean’s somewhat casual reference to this being a work in progress gives the impression that communities in the UK are being treated as ‘laboratory rats’ in an attempt to find a scientific justification for their theories.
CAN THE ERG22+ PREDICT FUTURE VIOLENCE?

Based on the 22+ factors that have been presented, it is difficult to say that x, y and z, in that combination, to a certain severity level will predict with 85% accuracy that a person convicted of extremism is likely to reoffend/commit an offence for the first time. Within a prison environment, structured professional guidelines for forensic psychologists would still be required in order to make better assessments as to risk, but to predict future criminality outside of that scenario would be almost impossible to ascertain.

Within the ERG system, the Lloyd and Dean paper appears to indicate that items are not scored – more factors does not mean higher engagement or higher intent or higher capability etc. therefore if one factor is identified and professional judgement ascertains that the risk is significant but the protective factors are not substantial then this may be reason to escalate the perceived threat further. What this means is that in an environment of risk, singular risk factors could lead to PREVENT and CHANNEL referrals.

One potential difficulty with it being a non-quantitative measure is that in ambiguous cases, it may be harder for a professional to be ‘pro-risk’ (e.g. the professional is satisfied the individual will not reoffend) if the consequence of them being ‘pro-risk’ is potential terrorist activity. A professional may be more inclined to err on the side of caution. Whereas a quantitative measure would mean that one could argue that the assessment outcome stated that the individual was unlikely to reoffend. This is not just the presence or absence of a factor – but what role it plays in the likelihood of committing an offence.

The authors state, “Our position is that in the UK society individuals are free to hold any beliefs and to express dissent, but where there are democratic means to accommodate this they should not resort to breaking the law or to the use of violence”. However, the factors created within the ERG 22+ do the exact opposite; in other words, they look to clampdown on religious and political beliefs that are not illegal. Even quoting from their own literature sources, they highlight the work of Savage and Lit, who state:

“Psychological pathology alone fails to explain either terrorists’ actions or the fundamentalist religiosity that is co-opted as its legitimation. Normal social psychological processes such as uncertainty reduction, terror management, social identity, meaning making (through religion), in combination with cognitive factors such as intratextuality and low integrative complexity, provide a more adequate understanding of the radicalization of young people, some of whom go on to commit violence against hated out-groups.”

The lack of clarity around ‘radicalisation’ processes has led to confusion in practice and understanding. The question then arises, why the authors have not intervened in the public in relation to bad PREVENT and CHANNEL referral cases? Surely, if their ‘science’ is being used incorrectly, they would feel compelled to contribute to the conversation around the negative referrals?

Given the large number of factors, the fact that they are vague and poorly specified, and the propensity for confirmation bias (interpreting evidence to confirm existing beliefs) even amongst those who are trained, the potential for ‘false positives’ would be high. The problem in short is that as the authors note, the method does not provide for predictive validity, but is being used to predict:

“The widespread use of the ERG demonstrates its face validity and utility, but it cannot be taken as a substitute for predictive validity...”

The authors admit that radicalisation is not, “a necessary precursor to extremist offending.” But the ERG is being used to stop people from being ‘radicalised’, which is assumed would stop them from falling into ‘violent extremism’. They also mention, “it is self evident that many individuals share extreme beliefs (are radicalised) but have no intention of performing an act of terrorism, and that it is possible for someone who has performed a terrorist act to desist from violence without relinquishing their ideology or cause.” However, PREVENT’s use of the ERG tool targets ideological beliefs based on the assumption that those who adopted ‘non-violent extremist’ beliefs will in turn become ‘radicalised’ and thus fall into ‘violent extremism’.

44 | Ibid, p.41
45 | Ibid, p.41
The Dean and Lloyd study was produced as ‘in-house’ research within NOMS for the government, and included a small advisory team of academics including: Stephen Hart (Simon Fraser University, Canada), David Cook (Glasgow Caledonian University, Scotland), Andrew Silke (University of East London, England), Caroline Logan (Glasgow Caledonian University, Scotland), Hazel Kemshall (De Montfort University, England), Jackie Bates-Gatson (Northern Ireland Prison Service) and Karl Roberts (Western Sydney University, Australia). No mention is made over the degree of involvement of this advisory team, although it is common practice for such committees to meet once or twice a year. As stated by Lloyd and Dean in a journal article discussed below, the peer review of their work was largely ‘in-house’:

“...the final version was peer reviewed within NOMS and by two of the international experts in risk assessment from the original advisory group—Professors Stephen Hart (Simon Fraser University, Canada) and David Cook (Glasgow Caledonian University, Scotland).”

The findings of the study, and in particular the theory of radicalisation that stems from it, have formed the centre piece of the government’s PREVENT and CHANNEL programmes in the UK. There are many references to the ERG22+ without any specific examples of these authors having engaged with its ‘science’, and yet there has been no open professional or peer scrutiny of its scientific methodology or indeed the datasets that it is based on. It might be assumed that either commentators are willing to quote the ERG22+’s existence and conclusions, without ever having actually engaged with its ‘science’, or that a few ‘picked’ commentators have been provided a level of access not open to the public or wider professional community.

Teachers, university lecturers, doctors, nurses, dentists, child minders and the entire public sector are provided training based on the 22
The ‘science’ of pre-crime

Finally, in relation to peer review processes within the field of psychology in the UK, the authors of the report claim their study has both ‘face’ and ‘content validity’. Content validity refers to how accurately an assessment or measurement tool taps into the various aspects of the specific construct in question. Face validity is the degree to which a procedure, especially a psychological test or assessment, appears to measure what it claims to assess. Both tests are considered to be the least sophisticated measures of validity. Tests wherein the purpose has shown to be clear, even to naïve respondents, are said to have high face validity. Accordingly, tests wherein the purpose has shown to be unclear have been found to have low face validity. Furthermore,
having face validity does not mean that a test really measures what the researcher intends to measure, rather it only does so in the judgment of raters using the tool. Consequently it is a crude and basic measure of validity.

The invocation of face validity as a marker of acceptability is perplexing, as it does not provide any form of real measure of validation. Lloyd and Dean also refer to content validity as part of their conclusions, however this appears from their journal article to be a subjective judgement, rather than an empirically evidenced position. For there to be a valuable insight into the validity of an assessment tool, they must be supported by other forms of validity, which in the case of the ERG+22 were not mentioned in the journal article.

For any qualitative study to pass a quality control test, every step of the research logistics (from theory formation, design of study, sampling, data acquisition and analysis to results and conclusions) has to be validated – particularly for transparency and systemization. Among a number of ways to determine the quality of qualitative research, six criteria have been identified: (i) clarification and justification, (ii) procedural rigor, (iii) sample representativeness, (iv) interpretative rigor, (v) reflexive and evaluative rigor and (vi) transferability/generalizability. In particular though, the gold standard within the field of psychology, is replicability of the research findings. Not only is the replication missing in this case, but the UK government has sought to statutorily enforce this ‘science’ on the basis of highly contested methodology.

Furthermore, the authors admit that the assessment tool was not checked for interrater reliability and that only now, five years after the study was completed and used as a basis for statutory legislation by the government, a study is being completed to test whether the ERG22+ measures what it purportedly set out to:

“An interrater reliability study is also being completed. As with other risk and need instruments, ongoing studies will develop our understanding of this area of risk and of the performance of the instrument and result in adaptations to the ERG over time.”

This ‘human experimentation’ has real world consequences, as the application of the ERG within the public space is a derivation of the,”work in progress”. The potential result is that there is an amplification of the problems associated with the errors in the ‘study’. Communities, rather than being experimented on, should have the ability to know where they stand precisely with the law, rather than being subjected to scrutiny through an unreliable set of factors by those who have had little to no specialised training.


51 | Leung L, Validity, reliability, and generalizability in qualitative research, Journal of Family Medicine and Primary Care, 2015, vol.4, no.3, p.324

Lloyd and Dean claim that they have provided a, “systematic, transparent, and accessible framework,” and yet the only place their work has been published is in a niche journal in America. Not only is this journal very young and hence with an unproven pedigree of scholarship – it is edited by the Professor Stephen Hart who was one of only two external individuals to NOMS to be formally involved in the review of the study.
A constant refrain of the government and those groups associated with PREVENT is the notion that PREVENT is largely focused on intervention before any criminal activity has taken place. PREVENT officials in numerous public statements have spoken of how the intention is to intervene before any need for criminal action becomes necessary. It is precisely in the intersection between the criminal justice system and this prevention work that a pseudo form of criminalisation takes place through the civil law.

As discussed above, through the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, referrals can be made to PREVENT by public sector employees, where there is a risk of an individual being drawn into terrorism. Once such a process begins and PREVENT or CHANNEL officials become involved, possibilities open up to the state to sanction individuals and families based on the need to ‘intervene’. Some of the types of cases that have been witnessed so far include:

1. Family law cases
2. Control order/Terrorism Prevention Investigative Measures (TPIMs) cases
3. Criminal cases
4. Prisoners challenging licensing restrictions
5. Prisoner classifications
6. Immigration cases

While the above set of cases are not exhaustive, they are representative of the ways in which the ‘science’ of ‘radicalisation’ has been integrated into the legal system in the UK. In particular, they indicate how there is no longer any question of ‘radicalisation’ as a process, as the line of cases seem to accept that the ‘science’ is accepted and verified. This is best exemplified by the judgement of Mr Justice Hayden in the High Court during the case of London Borough of Tower Hamlets v B:

“I have used terms such as ‘extremism and radicalisation’. These words are now, sadly, so much a part of contemporary life they scarcely need definition. That said it is important to avoid ambiguity, radicalisation is defined in the July 2015 Revised ‘Prevent Duty’ Guidance for England and Wales: Guidance for specified authorities in England and Wales on the duty in

**KEY POINTS**

- The ‘science’ of radicalisation is now integrated into the legal system and is used to pass judgements and set precedents.
- Psychologists now play a central role in many counter-terrorism cases.
the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 to have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism."

Mr Justice Hayden relies on the CTS Act 2015 and in particular the PREVENT strategy in order to establish the definitions from which he operates, particularly for the terms ‘radicalisation’ and ‘extremism’. This is, however, not a singular circumstance, but rather as recognised by the judge himself, as part of the judiciary’s accepted position on the process of ‘radicalisation’ thus affecting all decisions and judgements based on those theories.

Significant among the genus of cases that are currently appearing before the courts, are those that are referred to as ward of court cases. Through the CTS Act 2015 and PREVENT programmes, the government has sought to intervene in the homes of families where there is a risk of ‘radicalisation’, often forcing removal of children from the home. The following cases have all dealt with the processes of ‘radicalisation’ in the legal arguments and judgements, taking the government’s position as their starting point for discussion:

• London Borough of Tower Hamlets v B [2016]
• A Local Authority v M and others [2016]
• Brighton & Hove City Council v Mother, Father, Y (A Minor) [2015]
• Brighton and Hove City Council v The Mother, Y [2015]
• F v M, A, B (Children by their guardian) [2016]
• London Borough of Tower Hamlets v JD, LD, S (through her Children’s Guardian) [2015]
• In the matter of X (Children) v In the matter of Y (Children) [2015]
• In the matter of X (Children) (No 3) [2015]
• In the Matter of Z [2015]
• Leicester City Council v T [2016]
• Re K (Children) [2016]
• Re M (Children) [2014]
• Re Y (Children) [2016]
• In the matter of X (Children) v In the matter of Y (Children) (No 2) [2015]

‘Radicalisation’ has moved beyond an abstract concept that has little framework, and moved into the field of psychological ‘science’, as the courts seek an objective standard by which to judge cases before them. In the case of the ERG22+, this is specifically evoked through the Channel Vulnerability Assessment Framework in the case of **Brighton & Hove City Council v Mother, Father, Y (A Minor) [2015] EWHC 2098 (Fam):**

“That is called “Channel: Vulnerability assessment framework”. That document provides an outline of the vulnerability assessment framework used to guide decisions about whether an individual needs support to address their vulnerability to radicalisation and the kind of support that they need. This Framework, used by Channel, is a key element in the “Prevent strategy”. At its core lies the important reasoning that if there is to be effective prevention of radicalisation, it requires a multi-agency approach. It emphasises the use of existing collaboration between local authorities, education, health, social services, children and youth services, the police and the local community. I repeat that objective because it seems to me that its core premises have to be re-visited here by those involved in this family’s life. That is not to imply criticism; it is just to underscore that protection, whether it is of the old, of the disabled, of children or of those at risk
...psychologists reports, based on the ERG, are now being used within legal cases in order to make decisions. This is of concern, as they are being made on the basis of a ‘science’ that has never been properly scrutinised.
of radicalisation, as we are here dealing with, is always more effective when it is predicated on a multi-agency basis.

The framework, to my mind, bears scrutiny because so many of the features identified there seem so apposite to Y’s own life. “Engagement factors”, the document tells me, “are sometimes referred to as ‘psychological hooks’” by which is meant that they include “needs, susceptibilities, motivations and contextual influences” and they “together map a potential ‘pathway into terrorism’”. They can include, it is said, “feelings of grievance and injustice.” It is not difficult to see how Y could feel aggrieved and a sense of injustice. This entire family believes that their uncle at Guantanamo Bay was brutalised by the American Forces. Y, understandably, grieves the death of his brothers and his friend.

The Framework encourages the agencies of protection to look at whether the young person has “a need for identity, meaning and belonging; a desire for status; a desire for excitement and adventure; a need to dominate and control others”.  

“Not all those who become engaged by group, cause or ideology go on to develop an intention to cause harm, but it is clear that Y is a confused, unhappy, disaffected young man. He is extremely vulnerable, because of his family’s history, to radicalisation. Having seen his two brothers killed, one injured and his friend killed, it is all too clear that for him and his family the human tragedy involved is occluded by some kind of moral crusade; in other words he is more susceptible to such radicalisation because he has inevitably come to dehumanise those involved in the conflict. That renders him particularly susceptible.”

What is missing in these cases, is any questioning of the science that is being relied on within the courts. Legal judgements are being made and precedents being set on the basis of the ‘science’ of the ERG22+, and yet it has never been opened to scrutiny.

As a specific tool the ERG22+ has been referenced within the courts, particularly in the case R (Khatib) v Secretary of State for Justice, where the judgement recognised the use of the tool as part of a risk assessment. The judgement mentioned:

“Particular emphasis was placed on the fact that the claimant had successfully completed courses of various kinds whilst in prison. These included: educational programmes including three Islamic courses; the Sycamore Restorative Justice Programme, which addresses general issues relating to the impact of offending on victims; the Thinking Skills Programme, an accredited cognitive skills programme; a Motivation and Engagement intervention specifically designed for prisoners convicted of extremist offending; and, perhaps most relevantly, the claimant had voluntarily undertaken the ERG 22+ risk assessment which is a set of structured guidelines for assessing the risk of extremist offenders. This assessment was carried out in September 2012 by a psychologist, Ms Fiona Mulloy. She produced a report in March 2013 in which she recognised that the claimant had made real progress, commenting that “he no longer believes that people should be killed for the “greater good”, nor believes that violence is
a “means to an end.” However, she remained concerned about certain matters. For example, she noted that the claimant had not engaged in risk reduction work relating to his specific offence; and she noted also that he sought to place some distance between his offending and the present day, observing that “whilst this is a natural and understandable coping mechanism, it may act as a barrier to Mr Khatib being more open to fully exploring his vulnerability factors and therefore safeguarding against them.” These concerns were also identified in a later report in April 2014.\

The case gives an insight into the fact that psychologists reports, based on the ERG, are now being used within legal cases in order to make decisions. This is of concern, as they are being made on the basis of a ‘science’ that has never been properly scrutinised. A more thorough survey must be completed of all the legal cases that have dealt with the issue of ‘radicalisation’, however for now it must be acknowledged that the ‘science’ of the ERG22+ has entered into the legal field and is thus having direct implications on the lives of those who are subjected to it.
In July 2015, CAGE helped to organise a joint letter with over three hundred academics and many experts on Islam and the study of terrorism. The letter criticised the way in which the government’s PREVENT agenda would lead to a chilling effect on debate within the public space. CAGE spokesman Ibrahim Mohamoud said at the time:

“The PREVENT strategy has no peer-reviewed evidentiary basis showing a link between violence and ideology... The PREVENT policy has facilitated an atmosphere in which Muslims are incriminated within a pre-crime space for nothing more than holding opinions that run contrary to those taken by government. This increases the likelihood of disenfranchisement as opposed to countering it.”

In the same article, the Home Office provided a response in relation to the criticism that is worth reproducing in full:

“Protecting those who are vulnerable and at risk of radicalisation is both complex and vitally important, which is why it is disappointing to see simplistic claims that are at best inaccurate and at worst scaremongering.

“The PREVENT duty is about protecting those who might be vulnerable from the poisonous influence of extremism and stop them being drawn into terrorism. It is claimed this should not be considered a safeguarding issue, yet there can be fewer harms more serious for a teenager. Teachers, social workers and others are familiar with the concepts involved in safeguarding and can readily adapt them to the harms caused by terrorism.

“It is simplistic and wrong to claim PREVENT focuses ‘on religious interaction and Islamic symbolism to assess radicalisation’. There is no single cause of radicalisation. The CHANNEL programme, a part of PREVENT, assesses the vulnerability of those referred to it using a...
**comprehensive system of 22 different factors and guidance is explicit that ‘outward expression of faith, in the absence of any other indicator of vulnerability, is not a reason to make a referral to CHANNEL’.”**

In the above quote, not only did the government acknowledge that the ERG22+ was used as a part of the way in which referrals are made to PREVENT and CHANNEL, but that it is public sector workers, such as a teachers, who are best placed to make those considerations. This is deeply troubling, as all the psychologists spoken to regarding this study explained that not only should the study have been limited to assessing threat posed by individuals on release from prison, but that only trained psychologists who were familiar with wider understandings of their own field should have been permitted to play a role in making those assessments. The ERG22+, as a predictive tool is used in a way that goes well beyond that limited role, not only expanding those trained to probation staff with little wider understanding, but also to lay persons such a public sector workers.

The danger of over reporting based on this limited training is best highlighted by the fact that since the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 was brought into law in the summer of 2015, it has become a statutory duty for all public sector workers to make referrals to PREVENT and CHANNEL, based on a two-hour training course that is derived from the ERG22+. In an environment where the authors of the study themselves acknowledge that their theoretical justification and evidence base is limited, and that they have not fully reported their research, analysis or findings, this should never have become the basis of a statutory predictive tool. To state that the ERG22+ is an effective tool in assessing pre-criminality is beyond unethical, it is potentially a self-fulfilling prophecy due to the volume of ill-informed referrals that will be made.

Government statistics in relation to the PREVENT and CHANNEL programmes is often difficult to access, however we do know that between 2014 – 2015, there were almost 4,000 people referred for deradicalisation, including children aged nine and younger. Erin Saltman, from the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, who largely support their government’s extremism and PREVENT agendas, said of the PREVENT and CHANNEL training on ‘radicalisation’,
“The real problem is that a lot of signifiers are things that would be considered normal teenage behaviour, like changes in dress, changes in ability to want to talk to teachers or parents,”

“Teachers are fearful and want to safeguard students but they’re not being given very clear guidelines or training. What this will now do is shut down dialogue, rather than open up discourse and transparency within a classroom.”

The factors presented in the ERG22+ are multiple, broad, and poorly specified and even with training, people’s prejudices and simple confirmatory bias mean that pretty much anyone with a heartbeat could be identified as requiring scrutiny. Although we cannot eliminate injustice and grievance, given its importance in the process we should at least try to reduce this as much as possible. In a system where there is a statutory requirement to report, the chances of false positives occurring increase exponentially, leading of course to the danger that these statistics will lead to acceptance that the programme is working, not that it is potentially unreliable and counter-productive.

It is important to end with a point about the way in which the ERG22+ has been created. Where academic research is being used to justify an intervention such as the ERG and CHANNEL, the evidence base should be held to a higher level of scrutiny, not less. Rather than burying this paper in a specialist journal there should be an invitation to comment - this could have been done through the British Psychological Society. Whether or not the UK government and in particular the Home Office were being purposefully opaque in relation to the ‘science’ of the ERG22+ is now irrelevant, what is relevant now is for the government to answer difficult questions on how it came to institute a policy of assessing pre-criminal behaviour in 2011 using the ERG, when in 2015 the authors of that study were hesitant of its wider efficacy.
To state that the ERG22+ is an effective tool in assessing pre-criminality is beyond unethical, it is potentially a self-fulfilling prophecy due to the volume of ill-informed referrals that will be made.
RECOMMENDATIONS

Long-term approaches towards security will ultimately be what keeps the UK safe and encourage environments of cohesion within communities. Policies such as PREVENT, have only served to present a two-tier justice system, one which for the sake of short term political expediency, has led to a great deal of frustration, and communities feeling that they are under suspicion.

CAGE makes the following recommendations, in the hope that through patience and dialogue, the government and Muslim communities can reduce the levels of risk in society. For the purposes of this report, we focus our recommendations on four groups: The Home Office, the UK Parliament Home Affairs Select Committee, the British Psychological Society and grass-roots communities. We recommend:

THE HOME OFFICE

1. Publish the ERG22+ study to make it available for public scrutiny.
2. Undertake a full independent investigation to establish how and why the ERG22+ assessment tool was incorporated into the PREVENT and CHANNEL programmes while questions remained about its validity and reliability, as well as to identify the key individuals responsible for those decisions.
3. Recognise that political factors are important to many communities living in the UK, and acknowledge concerns, rather than pathologising them as grievances.
4. Treat mental health issues of individuals precisely as mental health issues, and not include them within a securitised narrative.
5. Acknowledge that PREVENT is a failed strategy, and be scrapped accordingly.
THE SECRET ‘RADICALISATION’ STUDY UNDERPINNING PREVENT

THE HOME AFFAIRS SELECT COMMITTEE

1. Seek answers from the Home Office in relation to the implementation of the ERG22+ and its wider significance.
2. Answer why they did not provide any responses to CAGE’s submission before the committee on the ERG22+? Did they simply ignore the evidence, or were they not provided answers by the government to the important questions asked?

COMMUNITIES

1. Are under a responsibility to educate themselves about the ‘science’ and ‘empirical’ quality of the government’s policies. Understanding the threats we face, will allow communities to better work with those who feel disenfranchised.
2. Should continue to hold the government to account for the implementation of the PREVENT strategy.
3. Working with the government’s PREVENT programme, and in particular those implementing the ERG22+, must reconsider their relationship.
4. Who took PREVENT funding, should undertake a full impact assessment of their role working with the government’s PREVENT strategy. This is for their benefit, to maintain the integrity of important work they may have been doing, that might be tainted by the association to PREVENT.

THE PSYCHOLOGY COMMUNITY

1. Call the government to make the original study and data sets used to create the ERG22+ available to external psychologists. Thus allowing it to be scrutinised and critiqued by the psychology community in Britain.
2. Call the government to be transparent in their dealings with psychology professionals and give the psychology community greater access to scrutinise future government funded studies that could potentially impact the human rights of individuals living in Britain.
3. Undertake a full investigation as to why the works of two psychologists were misused by the government. This is particularly important after it was regularly mentioned through academics, news outlets and politicians that the government’s wider use of the tool, for which it was not created, was negatively impacting communities in Britain.
The 'science' of pre-crime
The secret 'radicalisation' study underpinning PREVENT